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Argument diagrams, used in any number of textbooks on informal logic, were introduced 
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Conclusion 3  
 
Many argument diagrams can be done from the syntax of the discourse: X since Y signals Y as 
the premise, X as the conclusion; X since Y, and Y because Z signals a chain argument from Z to 
Y to X; and so on.  
 The sticking point for argument diagrams comes when there are two (or more) premises 
that purport to entail their conclusion: X because Y and Z. Now Y and Z can have two quite 
different relations to their conclusion X. They can “link” in their support of their conclusion, or 




She’s either in the study or the kitchen. She’s not in the study.
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Convergent Reasons
She typically goes to the kitchen around
this time to make a cup of tea.
I just saw her walking in the general
direction of the kitchen.
She’s in the kitchen.  
 
There are, we should agree, two very different argument structures here. And we must 
move beyond the pure syntax of the discourse to get at the difference in structure. X because of Y 
and Z merely positions X is the conclusion and Y and Z as the premises, but syntax can’t tell us 
whether Y and Z are linked or convergent. Various writers have tried to explain the distinction in 
various ways, though many of these accounts are wrong. 
 Copi and Cohen ask whether each of the premises (in the absence of the other) supports 
the conclusion independently (then the premises are convergent); or whether “neither premiss 
supports the conclusion independently,” in which case the premises are linked. [Copi and Cohen 
(2002, 14). Copi and Cohen use “dependent” and “independent” instead of “linked” and 
“convergent.”] Trudy Govier, too, thinks linked premises “only support the conclusion in the 
argument when they are taken together” (Govier, 2002, 47). (Govier doesn’t use argument 
diagrams though she raises the linked-convergent distinction.) However, convergent reasons do 
not support the conclusion “independently.” After all, they are part of the same argument, and 
somehow work together. It also isn’t exactly true that one of a pair of linked premises does not 
support the conclusion. It may support its conclusion feebly — “She’s either in the study or the 
kitchen” makes it fifty-fifty that she’s in the kitchen — but it supports it.  
Patrick Hurley writes that premises are linked when “one or more premises supports 
another in such a way that if one were omitted, the support that the others provide would be 
diminished or destroyed” (Hurley, 2000, 65). (His terminology is “conjoint” for “linked” and 
“horizontal” (!) for “convergent.”) But this confuses the support a premise provides on its own 
with its support when linked with another premise. “She’s either in the study or the kitchen” 
taken on its own supports its conclusion (“She’s in the kitchen”) with 0.5 probability, and that 
can’t be changed either by linking it with or unlinking it from “She’s not in the study.” 
Moore and Parker think that premises are convergent when “the falsity of one would not 
cancel the support the other provides to the conclusion.” Premises are linked when “the falsity of 
either premise would automatically cancel the support the other provides for the conclusion …” 
[Moore and Parker (1994, 227)]. This, however, confuses logical support with truth. “No women 
are philosophers and Jane is a woman” logically supports “Jane is not a philosopher.” Yet the 
major premise is false. Falsehood therefore doesn’t “cancel” logical support. Take the linked 
example above. Suppose it’s false that she’s not in the study. Throw that premise out and still the 
remaining disjunction still lends 0.5 probability to its conclusion.  
I should confess that I myself did not get the distinction exactly right in my first 
statement of it. “Reasons are dependent,” I wrote, “when together they make the overall strength 
of the argument much greater than they would considered separately. … Reasons are 
independent when together they do not make the overall strength of the argument much greater 
than they would considered separately” (Yanal, 1988, 42-43). Yet we should not consider even 
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independent (convergent) reasons “separately,” for they figure in the same argument. And how 
are we to understand “greater”? Greater than what? 
Stephen Thomas, whose book was among the first to use argument diagrams extensively, 
comes closest to getting the distinction right. “An argument is ‘linked’ when it involves several 
reasons, each of which is helped by the others to support the conclusion. …When two or more 
reasons do not support a conclusion in a united or combined way, but rather each reason supports 
the conclusion separately and independently of the other, the argument is convergent” (Thomas, 
1981, 53-54). Thomas is correct to say that linked premises “help” each other to support the 
conclusion — though so do convergent premises. The problem is to try to understand how linked 
premises “unite” or “combine” differently from convergent premises. 
Dissatisfied with the extant accounts of the distinction, I made a second try at it (Yanal, 
1991). Consider convergent arguments. Their diagrams picture their premises to be independent 
from one another. But this is deceptive, for the premises together make the conclusion more 
likely true than each premise considered separately. On the other hand, the premises of linked 
arguments together make their conclusion far more likely true than each premise considered 
separately. How, then, to mark this distinction with more specificity? How, in other words, to 
describe how premises link to establish their conclusion, and to distinguish this from how they 
converge on their conclusion? 
In the case of convergent arguments, assume that any single premise confers a certain 
probability on the conclusion. “She typically goes to the kitchen this time of day to make a cup 
of tea” confers some likelihood on “She’s in the kitchen.” Suppose that 4 out of 5 days she goes 
to the kitchen at this time to make tea. Then that premise confers on its conclusion a probability 
of 0.8. Now there is a remainder of uncertainty of 0.2 of whether she’s in the kitchen now. The 
second premise, that I’ve seen her walking in the direction of the kitchen, removes some of that 
uncertainty. Suppose that I’m generally right about what I see — say 75% of the time. Then we 
can say that the second premise reduces the uncertainty by 75%, or 0.75 times 0.2, which is 0.15. 
(To say the same thing in the positive, the second premise increases the certainty by 0.15 by 
removing the uncertainty of 0.15.) We’re then entitled to add the probabilities of the two 
premises, 0.8 + 0.15, and see that our two premises support the conclusion with a probability of 
0.95. We’ll call this the ordinary way of summing probabilities. 
 In the case of linked arguments, the premises don’t sum in the ordinary way. To see this, 
suppose we were to sum the probabilities of the premises in the ordinary way. Take the premise, 
“She’s either in the study or the kitchen.” This premise in itself confers a probability of 0.5 that 
she’s in the kitchen. The second premise, “She’s not in the study,” in itself confers a low 
probability that she’s in the kitchen — oh, say, 0.1 to make multiplication easier, but of course it 
must be much smaller. (Compare: “She’s not in the study, therefore she’s in Tibet.”) If the first 
premise leaves an uncertainty of 0.5, and the second premise takes away some of that uncertainty 
(0.1 times 0.5 = .05), and if we sum the probabilities in the ordinary way, we shall say that the 
premises, “She’s either in the study or the kitchen, but she’s not in the study” confer a 
probability of 0.55 (.5 + .05) on the conclusion, “She’s in the kitchen.” But this of course is quite 
wrong. The premises together confer a probability of 1.0 — of certainty — on their conclusion. 
If she’s either in the study or the kitchen, and she’s not in the study, then she must necessarily be 
in the kitchen.  
 My theory, then, can be summed up this way. Convergent arguments have premises 
whose probabilities sum in the ordinary way. Linked arguments have premises whose 
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probabilities don’t sum in the ordinary way. Linked arguments have reasons that “jump” 
ordinary probability sums.  
 Despite some confusion to the contrary, the linked-convergent distinction does not map 
onto the deductive-inductive distinction. While deductive arguments (whose conclusions are 
supported by more than one premise) are linked, inductive arguments can have linked reasons as 
well. An observer notes that of 100 crows each is black. He then infers that all crows are black. 
Is his argument convergent or linked? Would his argument diagram have one-hundred arrows or 
just one? If his observations sum in the ordinary way, any single black crow observation lends 
some slight probability to the conclusion that all crows are black, and of course leaves a large 
remainder of uncertainty. The next single black crow observation takes away some small bit of 
the remainder of uncertainty. And so does the next, and the next, and so on. Suppose one 
observation of a black crow makes it 0.001 likely that all crows are black, leaving an uncertainty 
of 0.999. Suppose the second observation of a black crow takes away 0.001 of uncertainty, 
leaving a mere 0.998. And so on, until 100 crows later we come to (about) 0.98 of uncertainty, or 
0.02 of certainty, that all crows are black.  
 That is, if our observer’s premises are summing ordinarily. Intuitively, though, 100 
observations of black crows should make it more than .02 probable that all crows are black. 
Granting the intuition, then, after observing a hundred black crows, we are entitled to say that the 
probability that all crows are black jumps beyond 0.02. Clearly we can’t say it is 1.0 certain that 
all crows are black, which is why linked enumerative inductions aren’t deductive arguments. But 
the set of observations confers more probability on its conclusion than their ordinary sum. Hence 
enumerative inductions are linked. 
 While I still think my theory is correct, I’ve come to see that it conflicts with four 
presumptions about argument diagrams.  
 The first I’ll call the presumption of priority. Argument diagrams are typically introduced 
in informal logic texts as a graphical way of exhibiting the structure of an argument. [Copi and 
Cohen and Hurley introduce argument diagrams in the first chapter of their respective texts 
(diagrams have been edging closer and closer to chapter 1 in successive editions of Copi). Moore 
and Parker introduce diagrams in their eighth chapter, though this is the first chapter introducing 
arguments. Govier brings in the linked-convergent distinction in her second chapter, which 
speaks to the structure of arguments.] What we can call the basic sequence in teaching logic is 
this: Structure first, logic second. Until we know which parts of an argument are premises and 
which conclusions, we can’t evaluate the logic of the argument. Argument diagrams are 
presumed to provide the structure of arguments.  
The second is the presumption of neutrality. A deductively valid argument as well as a 
fallacious argument both have a premise-conclusion structure. Since argument diagrams are 
presumed to function as the first part of the basic sequence. If so, they must be neutral with 
respect to the logic of the arguments thus diagrammed.  
The third and fourth I’ll refer to as the presumptions of completeness and correctness. 
Argument diagrams should be able to diagram any argument. There should be no argument that 
is, somehow, undiagrammable. And there should be exactly one correct diagram for an 
argument. No argument can be of two very different structures.  
These first two presumptions — priority and neutrality — are violated by the very 
distinction between linked and convergent reasons, at least on my theory. For on my theory we 
must evaluate the logic of the argument before we can do the diagram. Students must know, for 
example, that the premises of disjunctive syllogisms link, though they can only know this if we 
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already know that the premises render the argument’s conclusion as certain, that is, as not 
summing ordinarily. Students must know that the probability that the premises of enumerative 
inductions confer on their conclusion jumps beyond their ordinary sum. But this entangles 
evaluation with rendering structure.  
 The presumptions of completeness and correctness are also violated in the case of 
fallacious arguments. We have no trouble diagramming the following ad hominem: 
 
Peter is a Communist.
His history of the Soviet Union must be biased.  
 
But now consider the following fallacy: 
 
All cats are mammals. All dogs are mammals. So all cats are dogs. 
 
Are its premises linked or convergent? That is, do their probabilities sum ordinarily or do 
they “jump”? Consider the premises separately. “All cats are mammals” confers no probability 
on “All cats are dogs.” Ditto for “All dogs are mammals.” Since the probabilities are zero, the 
comparison between ordinary sums and jumping sums becomes pointless. If we had to choose 
between a linked and a convergent diagram, we would be forced to say either that the 
probabilities neither sum ordinarily nor jump (thus violating the presumption of completeness), 
or that the probabilities both sum ordinarily and jump (thus violating the presumption of 
correctness). This is an unfortunate consequence.  
 It may be thought these are the unfortunate consequences of my way of distinguishing 
linked from convergent premises, and therefore should be seen as a reductio ad absurdum of my 
theory. However, any way of distinguishing linked from convergent reasons that relies on the 
way the premises support their conclusion, which all extant distinctions in one way or the other 
do, will ultimately have to face up to the same problems.  
In conclusion: There is a linked-convergent distinction, though (a) it does not capture all 
multi-premised arguments; (b) it presupposes a kind of logical evaluation and cannot simply 
expose structure neutrally; and (c), because of (a) and (b), it seems best not to introduce the 
linked-convergent distinction right from the beginning in teaching informal logic — and perhaps 
informal logic should get along without the distinction altogether. Surprisingly, Monroe 
Beardsley, who seems to have introduced argument diagrams, does not draw the linked-
convergent distinction. He uses diagrams in but one section to exhibit the structure of long and 
complicated arguments (Beardsley, 1966, Ch. 1.3). The remainder of his book proceeds happily 
without them, and without the linked-convergent distinction, as do any number of popular 
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